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Abstract 
 
Credit booms have globally fuelled hikes in stock, raw material and real estate markets which 
have culminated in the recent US subprime market crisis. We explain the global asset market 
booms since the mid 1980s based on the overinvestment theories of Hayek, Wicksell and 
Schumpeter. We argue that ample liquidity supply originating in the large industrialized 
countries has contributed to overinvestment cycles in Japan, East Asia, the new markets in the 
industrial countries and many emerging market economies. Expansionary monetary policies 
in response to the burst of bubbles are argued to have contributed to vagabonding bubbles 
around the globe.  
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1 Introduction 
 
“Capitalism without failure is like religion without sin.” Charles Kindleberger’s (2000) book 
„Manias, Panics and Crashes“ points out that speculation and crises have always been present: 
the world economic crisis of the 20th century, the south-sea bubble in the 18th century, and 
the tulip mania in the first part of the 17th century. Emerging for different reasons, but always 
nurtured by euphoria, bubbles tend to grow for a while until they unload through a wave of 
collapsing asset prices and insolvencies. The morning after is characterized by deep 
recessions as overinvestment, overconsumption and speculative losses have to be digested by 
enterprises, consumers, and financial institutions.  
 
Although speculative bubbles are easy to identify ex post, they are – by definition – not 
realized ex ante by the majority of investors. The reason for the irrational upswing is the 
persistent hope for a soft landing or the belief that a well timed exit before the turnaround will 
be possible. In short, individual rational behaviour as “monkey see, monkey do” or the 
malaise of seeing the neighbour becoming rich explain the phenomenon of bubbles. While 
Kindleberger (2000) acknowledges that a speculative mania cannot be predicted, he identifies 
two (interdependent) factors that make them more likely. First, speculation is linked with 
positive economic expectations (as currently in China or Central and Eastern Europe). 
Second, ample liquidity makes hyperbolic investment more likely. 
 
Both factors seem relevant for the world economy since the mid 1980s. On the one hand the 
central banks in the large industrial countries have tended to provide ample liquidity in 
response to financial turmoil and the threat of recession. On the other hand economic 
prospects have been very positive in the new (stock) market segments in the industrialized 
countries and in an increasing number of emerging market economies. In particular East Asia 
and Central and Eastern Europe which are heading to become new hubs of industrial 
production have become economic focuses.  
 
From Kindleberger’s (2000) perspective it is not surprising that crises have occurred 
frequently since the mid 1980s because the worldwide liquidity supply was high and 
important new markets emerged. The outcome were (inter alia) the Japanese bubble (1989), 
the Tequila crisis (1994), the Asian crisis (1997/98), the Japanese financial crisis (1998), the 
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Russian flu (1998), the bursting dotcom bubble in the US and other industrialized economies 
(2000) and the almost bankruptcy of the LTCM hedge fund (2001). 
 
Since the year 2002 the turmoil of crises has calmed down as historically low interest rates 
boosted world growth. But since the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of 
England and even cautiously the Bank of Japan have continued to tighten the liquidity 
conditions, concerns about bursting bubbles are increasing. Recently the US real estate market 
has triggered financial turmoil around the globe, as single hedge funds and banks have come 
under distress. Also China and Central and Eastern Europe are considered to be other hot 
spots. 
 
 
2  The Global Liquidity Expansion 
 
Since the mid 1980s the global liquidity supply has been expanding steadily originating in the 
large capital markets in Japan, the United States and the euro area. Intermediated by 
internationalized financial markets and a fast increasing number of hedge funds, liquidity 
poured from the low yield developed financial markets into the high yield emerging market 
economies. As most emerging markets tended to stabilize the exchange rate either against the 
dollar or the euro the vivid capital inflows were translated into rapid foreign reserve 
accumulation, fast growing money supplies and buoyant credit growth.  
 
2.1  The Japanese Liquidity Glut and the Greenspan Put 
 
The first important step for the worldwide increase of money supply was taken in Japan 
during the 1980s. Following the September 1985 Plaza Agreement the Japanese yen 
appreciated by about fifty percent against the dollar far above the originally targeted level. To 
counteract the resulting deflationary pressure the Bank of Japan cut interest rates in response 
to the appreciation (Funabashi 1989). The downward trend continued until the end of the 
1990s when the Japanese money market rate reached the zero bound and Japan had fallen into 
the so-called liquidity trap (McKinnon and Ohno 1997) (Figure 1). Between January 1990 and 
December 2005 the Japanese monetary base had grown by 144 percent while output had 
expanded by merely 10 percent. 
 
 
 3
Figure 1: Money Market Interest Rates in the US, EMU and Japan 
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With money supply increasing considerably faster than output in the stagnating Japanese 
economy the so-called carry trade emerged. International investors and hedge funds borrowed 
at low interest rates in Japan and lend at high yields in emerging markets. Because Japan and 
most of the (East Asian) recipient countries stabilized their currencies against the dollar, the 
currency risk of the carry trade remained widely contained. The (default) risk of the emerging 
market investments seemed rather low as the capital inflows had a positive effect on the credit 
worthiness. With interest rates falling, investment and consumption rose contributing to more 
growth and improved credit ratings. The resulting boom periods allowed for low government 
deficits and better sovereign ratings. This attracted new capital inflows which reinforced the 
boom. 
 
The Greenspan era further contributed to the growing global liquidity supply. Just in office as 
the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee in August 1987, the New York 
Stock Exchange suddenly slumped. Greenspan – who claimed to favour a discretionary 
monetary policy which was able to react flexibly to short-term (financial market) 
developments – rushed to expand the liquidity supply to allow the financial institutions 
compensation for the losses. The monetary expansion in response to the (potential) financial 
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instability was justified by the fact that the collapse of one large financial institution would 
have destabilized the whole financial system by a chain reaction (Woodward 2001).  
 
With Greenspan in office until January 2006, the “Greenspan put” characterized the Federal 
Reserve’s policy stance for about twenty years. In the face of financial turmoil, the Federal 
Reserve stood ready to safeguard the financial sector by an increasing liquidity supply. In 
contrast, when stock markets hiked the Fed’s policy stance remained benign as during the 
dotcom boom: Greenspan talked about “irrational exuberance” while the federal funds rate 
was only increased hesitantly (Shiller 2001).1 When the New Economy bubble finally burst in 
October 2000 the – up to now – largest expansionary measure was taken. The federal funds 
rate fell from 6.5 percent in October 2000 to one percent in January 2003 (Figure 1). During 
Greenspan’s incumbency the money supply M3 had risen by 183 percent while real output 
had expanded by 70 percent.  
 
The European Central Bank followed hesitantly. After the ECB had started with a historically 
low interest rate level into the European Monetary Union and the euro had fallen strongly 
against the dollar, the ECB kept the interest rate high compared with the counterparts in the 
US and Japan. After the burst of the New Economy bubble interest rates were cut later and at 
a slower pace than by the Fed. But also in the euro area the main refinancing rate reached 
historical lows (Figure 1). Capital flows from the euro area into its small Central, Eastern and 
South-Eastern neighbouring countries accelerated. In specific, the Central and Eastern 
European countries with fixed exchange rate regimes experienced substantial accumulations 
of foreign reserves and monetary expansions.  
 
In summer 2004 before the Federal Reserve started to raise the federal funds rate to today 
5.25 percent, the global interest rate level – in Figure 2 approximated by the average interest 
rate in Japan, US and the euro area (Germany before 1999) – had reached its historical low. In 
real terms the average short-term interest rate had become negative.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Such “asymmetric” central bank behavior with respect to asset market developments is modeled by Illing 
(2001, 2007). 
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Figure 2: Average of US, EMU and Japanese Money Market Rates 
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2.2. Sticky Consumer Prices 
 
In contrast to the 1970s, when the fast monetary expansion in the industrialized countries led 
to a worldwide increase of inflation and a slow down of global growth, the declining interest 
rates since the mid 1980s left consumer price inflation widely untouched. Neither in the large 
industrial countries (Figure 3) nor in most emerging markets consumer price inflation 
accelerated beyond a level which could be perceived as detrimental for economic stability.  
 
In Japan during the second half of the 1980s where inflation had fallen to zero in response to 
the post-Plaza yen appreciation, the general price increases remained moderate while stock 
and real estate markets skyrocketed. During the post-bubble recession, the resulting deflation 
persisted despite immense increases of the monetary base (Figure 3).  The 144 percent growth 
of the Japanese monetary base between January 1990 and December 2005 was matched by a 
10 percent increase of the consumer price index.  
 
In the euro area, although the European Central Bank continued to “miss” its reference value 
for M3 growth by far, consumer price inflation was kept close to the 2 percent “target level”. 
Only little more inflation was observed in the US where the economy continued to boom 
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under Greenspan’s “magic” monetary policy (Figure 3). Even the sharp decline of the federal 
funds rate after the burst of the New Economy bubble did not trigger a worrying increase in 
consumer price inflation. During the incumbency of Alan Greenspan, stock prices had tripled, 
while inflation had remained moderate. Alternative approaches to inflation measurement like 
hedonic prices or core inflation which adjusted consumer price inflation by quality 
improvements and by (soaring) energy and food prices further softened concerns about 
inflationary pressure.   
 
Figure 3: Consumer Price Inflation in the US, EMU and Japan 
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The academic community reacted in two ways. First, explicit or implicit inflation targeting 
frameworks (Bernanke and Mishkin 1997, Mishkin 2000) became popular in industrial 
countries. Because the growth of the money demand and its impact on inflation had become 
difficult to predict, (expected) inflation was seen as a more reliable monetary policy target. 
Also an increasing number of emerging market economies adopted inflation targeting 
frameworks – often instead of (explicit) exchange rate pegs. (Controlled) appreciations of the 
emerging market currencies helped to achieve ambitious inflation targets.  
 
The rise of inflation targeting regimes was accompanied by criticism concerning monetary 
policy targets as represented by the (now) second pillar of the ECB monetary policy strategy. 
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A neo-Keynesian model generation (Woodford 2001) suggests that monetary policy decisions 
can be made without particular reference to money. Because the (academic) focus of 
monetary policy shifted from broad money supply towards inflation targeting, moderate 
observed consumer price inflation as a proxy for future inflation seemed to legitimate high 
growth rates of money supply. Implicit inflation targeting regimes as used by the Federal 
Reserve provided additional discretionary leeway for monetary policy decisions. 
 
A second strand of literature – which can be seen as the monetarist view – focused on the 
impact of the liquidity conditions on asset markets. As stock and real estate prices soared 
while inflation remained moderate, it was argued that surplus liquidity mainly poured into the 
asset markets and that consumer prices had ceded to provide a comprehensive measure of 
inflation (Polleit 2005). With inflation being interpreted as a in the long term (always and 
everywhere) monetary phenomenon it was proposed to include asset prices, in specific real 
estate prices, into the monetary policy objective function.  
 
Indeed, bubbles seemed to emerge in stock, raw material, currency and real estate markets in 
both the industrial countries and in a rising number of emerging market economies. Once a 
bubble burst somewhere in the world, new bubbles propped up somewhere else: Bubbles 
vagabonded around the globe, for instance from Japan to East Asia, from East Asia to the 
New Markets of the industrialized countries, and from there inter alia to the US real estate 
market, Central and Eastern Europe, China and the raw material exporting countries. 
 
 
3  Boom-and-Bust Cycles in East Asia and the New Markets 
 
The first wave of bubbles emerged in “mighty” East Asia on its ascension to the worlds’ new 
industrial hub. The Japanese bubble economy in the 1980s as well as the East Asian boom in 
the 1990s can be explained by the real and monetary overinvestment theories of Joseph 
Schumpeter (1983), Friedrich August von Hayek (1976), and Knut Wicksell (2005).  
 
3.1 The Overinvestment Theories  
 
Schumpeter (1983), Hayek (1976), and Wicksell (2005) developed their overinvestment 
theories in the early 20th century to explain business cycles as the outcome of innovation (real 
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overinvestment theories) and benign liquidity conditions (monetary overinvestment theories). 
In the monetary overinvestment theories the cyclical fluctuations are either caused by a 
“pervert elasticity” of the private banking sector (Hayek) or by central bank “mistakes” 
(Wicksell). Asset market bubbles were seen as a side effect of real output fluctuations. 
 
The overinvestment theories are based on the distinction between three types of interest rates: 
First, the “internal interest rate” reflects the expected return of planned investment projects. 
Second, the “natural interest rate” is equivalent to an equilibrium interest rate which balances 
supply (saving) and demand (investment) on capital markets. Third, the “the money market 
rate” is set by the banking sector (Hayek) or by the central bank (Wicksell). A business cycle 
is triggered when the internal interest rate rises (Schumpeter) and / or the money market rate 
falls below the natural interest rate (Hayek and Wicksell).  
 
Figure A: Equilibrium 
        
 
As in Figure A as long as the natural interest rate in1 is equal to the money market rate im12 
saving S1 is equal to investment I1. The capital and goods markets are in equilibrium and there 
is no upward pressure on inflation. In Schumpeter’s framework the economic upswing starts 
due to an exogenous rise of the internal interest rate ii. According to Hayek, Schumpeter’s 
concept of “new combinations” (i.e. innovations) can be the reason for a rising internal 
interest rate (Hayek 1976, 95). The expected returns of investment may also rise due to new 
production processes or technologies – as in the case of the New Economy – or by the 
discovery of new markets or production locations – as in the case of China and Central and 
                                                 
2 For simplicity it is assumed that the money market interest rate is equal to the capital market interest rate. 
I, S 
Iii1 
I1=S1
i S 
Iii2 
in2=im2 
in1=im1 
I2=S2
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Eastern Europe. New financial instruments as in the US subprime market can be seen as 
another type of innovation.  
 
With a rising internal interest rate investment is growing and the demand on money (capital) 
markets expands. This leads to a rising natural interest rate (in2>in1). To maintain the capital 
and goods markets in equilibrium, in perfect capital markets the money market interest rate 
would increase as well (in2=im2 in Figure A). But in Wicksell’s model the central bank 
continues to supply liquidity at an unchanged money market rate (im1=im2).  
 
The positive differential between the natural interest rate and the prevailing money market 
interest rate (in2>im2 in Figure B) drives the economic upswing. Enterprises start investment 
projects with both high and comparatively low expected returns (Wicksell 2005, 113). In 
Figure B, which models the upswing, private savings remain constant because additional 
savings are not rewarded by a higher money market interest rate. As investment continues to 
grow due to multiplication effects, an investment overhang emerges (I2>S2) (Wicksell 2005, 
134). 
 
Figure B: Upswing 
                
While in Wicksell’s (2005) framework the central bank is responsible for the “liquidity 
overhang”, Hayek (1976) assumes that the money creation originates in the private banking 
sector. The competition among the financial institutions spurs credit growth. The banking 
sectors’ credit to the private sector exceeds the amount of savings for two reasons (Hayek 
1976, 84, 99-103). First, competition among commercial banks holds interest rates down. 
Iii1 
I1=S1=S2
i
SIii2 
in1=im1=im2 
positive interest 
differential 
I, S 
in2 
I2
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Second the commercial banks underestimate the risks linked to overborrowing. Moral hazard 
matters when depositors and banks believe that possible losses in the case of speculation will 
be covered by an (deposit) insurance system (Herring and Wachter 2002, 10). Alternatively, 
the hope that interest rates will decline rapidly in response to a bursting bubble may 
contribute to moral hazard. 
 
The upswing continues as the demand for investment goods rises. Wages and consumption 
increase. Capacity reserves are activated. The positive economic expectations can be 
transmitted to the asset markets where speculation may set in. According to Schumpeter 
(1983, 237) price expectations of stocks and other real assets can be disconnected from the 
real economic development. A speculative mania may emerge, in which speculative price 
projections and “the symptoms of prosperity themselves finally become, in the well known 
manner, a factor of prosperity” (Schumpeter 1983, 226). Finally also (sticky) consumer price 
inflation accelerates (Wicksell 2005: 119-124, 127, 134). 
 
With investment exceeding saving the economic upswing is not sustainable and the 
turnaround is inevitable. It occurs when consumer and asset price inflation in asset markets 
accelerate. In Wicksell’s model (2005, 134) the central bank finally increases the interest rate 
to contain the inflationary pressure. In Hayek’s (1976, 101) framework the banking sector 
does not renew credit lines after reassessing the risk. With the money market rate rising, the 
threshold for the profitability of all previous investment projects is lifted. Now, (speculative) 
investment projects which are characterized by an internal interest rate which is below the 
risen money market rate become obvious and are dismantled.  
 
The structural adjustment pulls enterprises, consumers and financial institutions into the 
whirlpool of the crisis (Hayek 1976, 102-103). As single investment projects are dismantled, 
others become unprofitable as general demand declines (negative multiplication effect). 
Expectations turn negative which further dampens the investment and consumption activity. 
A recession follows which will be the deeper the larger the “exuberance” has been.  In 
Wicksell’s theory the central bank aggravates the economic downturn as the response to the 
inflationary pressure is too harsh and the money market interest rate is held above the natural 
interest rate (Figure C). The negative interest rate differential contributes to increasing 
unemployment and declining stock prices.  
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Figure C: Downswing 
         
 
According to Hayek (1976) the structural adjustment after the turnaround is a necessary 
prerequisite for the recovery after the slump. Profitable investment projects (with high 
internal interest rates) are separated from investment projects with low profitability (low 
internal interest rates). Schumpeter (1983, 213) argues that “every boom is followed by 
depression, every depression by a boom”. The “creative destruction” during the downswing is 
seen as the prerequisite for the new upswing as it clears the market of non-profitable 
investment projects (Schumpeter 1983, 213). Without such a cumbersome process investment 
projects with low internal interest rate would be maintained, the necessary restructuring 
would be postponed, and the following upswing would not be sustainable.  
 
3.2  Vagabonding Bubbles in East Asia and the New Markets 
 
Schumpeter’s (1983), Hayek’s (1976) and Wicksell’s (2005) overinvestment theories can be 
used as tools to analyse the role of the monetary policies in the large industrialized countries 
for the boom and bust cycles in East Asia and in the New Markets. They also allow a 
projection of the future path of international financial and economic stability.  
 
Given East Asia’s bright economic perspective during the past three decades, it is in line with 
Kindleberger (2000) that speculative bubbles have in particular emerged there. Although the 
overinvestment theories explain business cycles in a closed economy, they also fit for open 
economies which are linked through international capital markets. In East Asia, the Bank of 
Japan can be seen as the source of ample liquidity which contributed to bubbles in Japan and 
its small neighbouring economies. When after the Asian crisis the international capital drifted 
Iii3 
I3
i 
S Iii2 
im3 
in3 
I, S
negative interest 
differential 
S3
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back into the safe havens of the industrialized countries, it was absorbed by the IT Markets, 
i.e. the so-called New Economy or dotcom bubbles. 
 
Bubbles in Japan and East Asia  
 
The first important bubble emerged in the mid 1980s in Japan. After Japan had liberalized its 
international capital flows in the early 1980s, a substantial trade surplus came into existence 
which was matched by a trade deficit of the United States. Japan’s export surplus was linked 
to the strength of its (high technology) industry. A euphoria concerning the Japanese 
economic power emerged.3 The 1985 Plaza Agreement was a (US led) internationally 
coordinated attempt to reduce the US-Japanese trade imbalance by a strong appreciation of 
the yen against the dollar (Funabashi 1989).4 After the Plaza Agreement had failed to reduce 
the trade surplus Japan agreed to implement expansionary monetary and fiscal policies to 
reduce the imbalance via a rising import demand (Louvre Accord in February 1987).  
 
The Plaza and Louvre agreements can be seen as the origin of the Japanese bubble economy. 
In response to the Plaza appreciation the Bank of Japan gradually lowered interest rates to 
counteract the strong “high-yen induced” recession (McKinnon and Ohno 1997) (Figure 4). 
After Japanese growth had picked up again in 1987 the interest cuts continued due to the 
expansionary macroeconomic policies following the Louvre Accord. The Japanese call 
money rate declined from 8 percent in December 85 to 3.5 percent in March 88. Thus, as in 
Wicksell’s theory the central bank reduced the interest rate although output expanded.  
 
The outcome was a speculation boom in the Japanese real estate and stock markets (Figure 
5).5  Between 1985 and December 1989 prices at the Tokyo stock exchange tripled. Real 
estate prices soared and the land price of the Japan’s imperial palace reached the worth of 
whole California (Schnabl and Starbatty 1998, 13). In line with Wicksell’s monetary 
overinvestment theory – and the benefit of hindsight – Bernanke (2000: 150-151) called the 
Bank of Japan monetary policy during the bubble a “central bank failure”.  
 
                                                 
3 Japans international economic success triggered a  “bubble” of (academic) literature which analysed the 
reasons. One in this respect outstanding book is the “Enigma of Japanese Power” by Karel van Wolferen (1990). 
4 This is reminiscent of current attempts to urge China to appreciate the Chinese yuan to correct the Chinese-US 
trade imbalance (see for instance “The Case for a New Plaza Agreement” by Cline (2005)). 
5 Other factors such as the liberalization of the Japanese financial market contributed to the bubble. For further 
analysis see Bayoumi and Collyns (2000).  
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Figure 4: Yen/Dollar Exchange Rate and Japanese Call Money Rate 
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Source: IMF: IFS. 
 
Like in Wicksell’s model, the bubble was pricked in December 1989 by the central bank, 
which strived to contain the bubble. From May 1988 the Japanese money market rate climbed 
from 3.5 percent back to 8 percent in June 1990 (Figure 1). The resulting burst of the bubble 
in December 1989 brought Japan into an unprecedented recession which persisted during the 
whole 1990s (the “lost decade”). The financial institutions suffered from a severe bad loan 
problem which was transmitted via a credit crunch to the enterprise sector (Hutchison, Ito and 
Westermann 2006). Now as in Wicksells’ model, the Bank of Japan was criticized to have 
held interest rates too high for too long (Bernanke 2000: 150-151).  To counteract the deep 
recession the monetary stance was loosened again and interest rates drifted gradually towards 
zero (Figure 1).  
 
Hayek (1976, 95-103) provides an explanation why Japan’s post-bubble liquidity glut could 
not revive the ailing Japanese economy. The injections of cheap liquidity postponed the 
“creative destruction” in the financial and enterprise sector thereby conserving the structural 
distortions which had emerged during the bubble. Instead of stimulating Japans economy the 
monetary loosening brought the bubble to Japan’s small East Asian neighbouring countries. 
The ailing Japanese financial institutions strengthened their capital ratios by borrowing in 
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Japan at very low interest rates and lending at high interest rates to the smaller East Asian 
economies.  
 
This carry trade and hunt for yield in two generations of tiger economies led to rising 
international liabilities, foreign exchange exposure and buoyant asset markets in South-East 
Asia. Because all East Asian countries (and Japan) stabilized their currencies against the 
dollar, the currency risk of the carry trade seemed to be contained. In Figure 5 Malaysia 
represents the investment boom in the East Asian tiger economies. 
 
 
Figure 5: Stock Markets in Japan, Malaysia, the US and China 
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In contrast to Japan the cumulative upswing in East Asia was not triggered by the local central 
banks but as in Hayek’s framework by the private international financial institutions which 
invested (Japanese) money in the small South-East Asian countries. The central banks of the 
tiger states contributed insofar as they translated capital inflows into monetary expansion via 
foreign exchange intervention.  
 
The liquidity supply got tighter when growth in Japan recovered and capital outflows from 
Japan slowed down after 1995. The South-East Asian stock prices oscillated at a high level 
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(Figure 5). Rising consumer price inflation, unrealistic stock and real estate prices, real 
appreciation and growing current account deficits were seen an indication that the East Asian 
boom was not sustainable. Foreign exchange intervention against the rising depreciation 
pressure led to falling foreign reserves and rising interest rates. Finally the currencies of five 
highly indebted tiger economies crashed. Because the foreign debt was mainly denominated 
in foreign currency, the financial crisis was inevitable. A painful structural adjustment process 
followed. 
 
The Asian crisis visualized the financial interdependence between the debtor nations (tiger 
states) and the creditor country (Japan) which brought the crisis back to Japan (Schnabl and 
Starbatty 1998, 13). With the Asian crisis Japanese exports to South-East Asia and Japanese 
FDI in South-East Asia suffered. The Japanese banking sector which was already troubled by 
an immense domestic bad loan problem was weakened by new loan defaults in the small 
neighbouring countries. The Nikkei began to fall triggering the Japanese financial crisis 
which hit its peak with the bankruptcy of major financial institutions. The economic recovery 
of Japan was retarded for years, the interest rate hit the zero bound and the carry trade 
accelerated again. 
 
The New Economy and Subprime Bubbles 
 
When emerging markets are struck by crises, international capital pours into the safe havens 
of the industrialized economies. In line with Hayek, now private capital nurtured the “New 
Economy” booms. Driven by euphoria about the digital revolution prices of IT (related) 
enterprises started to hike in the US (Nasdaq) and Europe (as represented by the Nasdaq in 
Figure 5). Soon Yahoo, Google and others dwarfed the companies of the “old market”. The 
profits of IT related enterprises, investment banks and hedge funds flourished. Alan 
Greenspan talked of “irrational exuberance”, while – in contrast to the Bank of Japan in 
response to the Japanese bubble – US interest rates remained widely unchanged (Shiller 
2000). Greenspan argued that policy makers should not try to prick a bubble because it was 
extremely hard to spot them before they actually burst (Economist 2007). 
 
The exuberance hit its peak in March 2000. In line with Hayek (1976) the turnaround was 
triggered by a reversal in the private sentiment. Because the extreme price decline in the new 
markets was expected to come along with huge losses for banks and hedge funds (including 
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spillovers to the real economy), the Federal Reserve cut its key interests rate rapidly to the 
historical low of one percent (Figure 1). From this perspective the post-bubble “policy 
failure” of the Bank of Japan (Bernanke 2000: 150-151) was not repeated in the US. Illing 
(2007) shows theoretically how interest rate cuts after the turnaround as most recently 
expected in response to the US subprime crises can prevent a meltdown. In Europe where 
similar exuberance had taken place, the European Central Bank reduced interest rates less and 
the European banks and enterprises faced more severe restructurings.  
 
In the US the sharp interest cuts in response to the bursting bubble allowed financial 
institutions to compensate their losses more easily by new financial transactions. The 
economic slow down was short and real estate prices started to rise. Once expectations 
concerning price increases become sustained, according to Hayek (1976) the upward trend 
can be self-fulfilling. On the demand side of the real estate market, higher prices signal higher 
profits and more investors are attracted. The reservation price of real estate, which represents 
the propensity to pay, rises. On the supply side, real estate sales tend to decline as price 
increases are expected. The upward trend in real estate prices accelerates (Herring and 
Wachter 2002).  
 
In times of falling interest rates the financial sector can create additional demand for credit not 
only via a lower price for its products but also by easing the credit conditions. If at a given 
interest rate the demand for the additional credit is too low, competition among the financial 
institutions may lead to less restrictive credit conditions, for instance in form of ninja loans (to 
people with No Income, No Job or Assets) as in the US subprime market. Such a falling 
quality of investment is more likely in the later phase of the upswing, as prime borrowers (or 
high yield investment projects) will be served (realized) first. 
  
Thus, fuelled by the rapid monetary expansion a speculation bubble in the US real estate 
market (as represented by the Nareit index in Figure 6) emerged.6 The burst of this real estate 
bubble triggered major concerns about economic instability in the US and important US 
creditor countries. Rising instability of the US and global financial markets led to increasing 
expectations that the Federal Reserve would lower interest rates and that the Bank of Japan 
and the European Central Bank would postpone interest rate increases. 
  
                                                 
6 Greiber und Setzer (2007) show empirically that increasing money supply has affected real estate prices in both 
the US and the euro area.  
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Figure 6: Stock Markets in China, US, Bulgaria and the Nareit real estate index 
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4  Upswings in Emerging Markets and the Role of the Exchange Rate Regime  
 
With the US being in the center of the world currency system the low level of interest rates in 
the US from 2001 into 2005 had international implications, as rising capital outflows from the 
US brought the dollar under depreciation pressure. In particular, emerging markets with 
(softly) fixed exchange rates (against the dollar) experienced fast reserve accumulation, brisk 
monetary expansion and “excessive” credit growth. The prices of (the mostly dollar 
denominated) raw materials soared (Figure 6).   
 
4.1  Credit Growth in China and Central and Eastern Europe 
 
Capital inflows into (inter alia) China and Central and Eastern Europe contributed to 
accelerating credit growth. In particular the East Asian countries (except Japan) – which 
traditionally (softly) pegged their currencies to the dollar – became the recipients of rising 
capital inflows. Now China had emerged as a global economic player which attracted due to 
the positive economic outlook both large amounts of foreign direct investment and short-term 
capital inflows. With the Chinese yuan being tightly pegged to the dollar, the rapid reserve 
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accumulation (Figure 7) was translated into a strong monetary expansion, as sterilization 
remained incomplete.7  
 
Figure 7: Foreign Reserves in the US, Japan, China and Bulgaria 
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While the consumer price inflation in East Asia remained contained the resulting credit 
growth contributed to new booms, now with a special focus on China. Private international 
capital markets provided capital to the high growth Chinese economy at very low and widely 
unchanged interest rates. Despite an average growth rate of around ten percent lending rates in 
China were around 5.5 percent, substantially below the real growth rate. In contrast the 
nominal lending rate in the US remained substantially above the real growth rate. From 
Hayek (1976)’s perspective, the international capital inflows (and indirectly the expansionary 
policy of the US Fed) kept the Chinese interest rates “artificially” low. 
 
Stocks at the Shanghai Stock Exchange (Figure 5) and other East Asian markets hiked.  The 
now former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan commented that Chinese share 
prices were “clearly unsustainable” with a risk of a “dramatic contraction” (Economist 2007). 
Because for the Peoples Bank of China the scope for restrictive monetary measures was 
                                                 
7 In the case of China with fixed exchange rates the reserve accumulation is particularly strong as in addition to 
FDI and short-term capital inflows the current account is positive (McKinnon and Schnabl 2006).  
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limited under the tight dollar peg (and therefore sterilization was incomplete), the Chinese 
government sought to slow down the stock market mania by moral suasion, regulatory 
measures and a stamp tax on stock transactions. 
 
In Europe, after the burst of the new economy bubble, the interest rate cuts of the European 
Central Bank contributed to capital inflows into Central and Eastern Europe. Similarly to 
China a positive economic outlook of the region attracted both foreign direct investment and 
short-term capital inflows. Bank lending from euro area banks to their Central and Eastern 
European subsidiaries mushroomed due to high interest rate spreads vis-à-vis the euro area 
(Figure 8).  In particular countries with fixed exchange rates – such as Bulgaria (Figure 7) and 
the Baltics – accumulated large stocks of foreign reserves. Stock, real estate and raw material 
prices skyrocketed (Figure 6).  
 
While the post-crisis East Asian countries including China (similar to pre-bubble Japan) 
continue to run current account surpluses, the Central and Eastern European countries exhibit 
similar macroeconomic characteristics like the East Asian crisis economies before the crisis. 
In particular in the Central and Eastern European countries with fixed and intermediate 
exchange rate regimes capital inflows were reflected in rising asset prices, real appreciations 
and rising current account deficits. Although this deteriorating macroeconomic outlook can be 
seen as a sign for upcoming instability, in contrast to pre-crisis East Asia the stability of the 
foreign owned banking sectors and large stocks of FDI are arguments against possible 
financial turmoil.  
 
Based on the overinvestment theories of Hayek (1976) and Wicksell (2005) there are two 
possible triggers for an economic turnaround. First, as the investment booms persist the 
internal interest rates of the new local investment projects tend to decline. Speculative 
investment might proliferate. Second, the future returns (internal interest rates) hinge on a low 
interest rate in the creditor country. Also stable exchange rates against the currency of the 
creditor country matter as in the emerging market economies foreign debt tends to be 
denominated in foreign currency (original sin) (Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999). 
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Figure 8: Central and Eastern European Money Market Interest Rate Spread versus the   
Euro Area 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06
pe
rc
en
t p
er
 a
nn
um
  .
Euro area interest rate
Central and Eastern European average interest rate
Spread
Source: IMF: IFS. The Central and Eastern European countries comprise the ten Central and 
Eastern European new EU member states. Arithmetic average.  
 
The declining marginal productivity of (financial) investment in Central and Eastern Europe 
during the upswing can be assumed to be reflected by the spread between borrowing and 
lending rates. As shown in Figure 8 at the beginning of the economic upswing the spread 
between the euro area (euro) money market rate and the domestic lending rates was large. As 
capital inflows continued due to competition among banks the lending rates declined and the 
spreads were squeezed. To sustain profits at lower margins banks have an incentive to extend 
the lending volumes by taking more risk (Hayek 1976, 99). The share of foreign liabilities as 
percent of total liabilities in the aggregated balance sheets of the financial sectors increased 
rapidly together with the aggregated foreign exchange exposure (Backé, Égert and Zumer 
2007).  
 
The capital inflows into the emerging markets tend to slow down when interest rates in the 
large industrial countries rise as since 2004 when the Federal Reserve took the lead in a 
tighter monetary policy stance. According to Wicksell (2005) and Hayek (1976) an increase 
of interest rates signals the turnaround of the business cycle. The threshold for the 
profitability of investment projects is rising and an increasing of number of (speculative) 
investment projects may turn out as non-profitable. As Martin, Schuknecht und Vanstenniste 
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(2007, 26) put it the ”reversal of capital flows can easily tip countries from a “simple” bust 
into a full-fledged crisis when there are significant external liabilities – even when public debt 
is small.” Contagion can transport the turmoil across the (emerging) world.  
 
4.2 The Role of the Exchange Rate Regime   
 
The overinvestment theories of Schumpeter (1983), Hayek (1976) and Wicksell (2005) were 
modelled for closed economies and do not provide information with respect to the role of the 
exchange rate regime for boom and bust cycles. Fixed exchange rates have played a crucial 
role for the East Asian crisis (Fischer 2001) and for the credit booms in China and Central and 
Eastern Europe (Schnabl 2007a). As shown in Figure 9, the Central and Eastern European 
countries with fully flexible exchange rates such as for instance Poland experienced more 
moderate credit growth than the countries with (softly) fixed exchange rate regimes such as 
for instance Estonia and Romania. Does this imply that flexible exchange rates are the better 
policy response for emerging market economies to buoyant capital inflows? 
 
Figure 9: Credit to the Private Sector in Estonia, Poland and Romania 
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In general, fixed exchange rates contribute to a more efficient international capital allocation 
and macroeconomic stability in small open economies (Schnabl 2007b).  Because under fixed 
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exchange rates the central bank of the pegging country mimics the monetary policy of the 
anchor country, an overinvestment boom in the emerging market can be caused by a low 
interest rate in the anchor country. This is even more the case because financial stability in the 
pegging country does not enter the objective function of the anchor countries’ central bank. 
The risk of overinvestment in the emerging markets with fixed exchange rates rises when the 
monetary conditions in the anchor country are exceptionally loose.  
 
Figure 10: Foreign Reserves in Estonia, Poland and Romania 
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For instance, as in Estonia the exchange rate is tightly pegged, capital inflows are translated 
directly into a monetary expansion. This favours credit growth and possibly overinvestment, 
because the scope to control the monetary expansion by sterilization is limited.8 In contrast, if 
the central bank leaves the exchange rate to market forces, the appreciation of the domestic 
currency would slow down exports and growth. The deteriorating growth outlook is likely to 
dampen capital inflows. Indeed, Poland which has allowed for full exchange rate flexibility 
has experienced the slowest reserve accumulation among the Central and Eastern European 
economies (Figure 10). Credit to the private sector as percent of total assets of the banking 
sector has even declined since 2001 (Figure 9).  
 
                                                 
8 Every attempt to tighten the money supply leads to interest rate increases which attract new capital inflows.  
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But the cost of fully flexible exchange rates in the face of buoyant capital inflows is 
significantly lower growth as exports decline. Due to higher uncertainty the risk premium on 
interest rates will rise slowing down investment and consumption (Schnabl 2007b). The 
upshot is that a strong appreciation in response to capital inflows will be politically difficult to 
defend. The likelihood of discretionary foreign exchange intervention against “excessive 
appreciation” rises. This is even more the case when GDP per capita is low (as currently in 
China) and if neighbouring countries with fixed exchange rate regimes experience high 
growth due to buoyant capital inflows (as currently in Estonia). 
 
If the growth outlook improves due to discretionary exchange rate smoothing and if 
appreciation expectations become sustained this may encourage one way bets on the 
appreciation. The outcome can be additional speculative capital inflows. For instance, 
Romania which has allowed for a controlled appreciation of its currency since 2004 has 
experienced the fastest accumulation of foreign reserves among the Central and Eastern 
European economies (Figure 10). Credit to the private sector as percent of total assets of the 
banking sector has increased fast surpassing the level in Poland and approaching the level of 
Estonia (Figure 9). This implies a fast rising foreign exchange exposure of the Romanian 
financial sector. Similarly as shown for Japan after the Plaza Agreement, discretionary 
interest rate cuts which intend to dampen appreciation pressure (instead of foreign exchange 
intervention) can trigger speculative bubbles also in countries with (widely) flexible exchange 
rate regimes.  
 
The fact that appreciation expectations contribute to lower interest rates in comparison to a 
fixed exchange rate regime can also be observed in China. China which has allowed for a 
controlled appreciation of the Chinese yuan since July 2005 did not experience a slow down 
in reserve accumulation (although US interest rates continued to increase) (Figure 7). 
Moreover the short-term interest rate has fallen below the US interest level further stimulating 
the economic activity of the Chinese economy. In contrast, in Hong Kong which has kept its 
exchange rate tightly pegged to the dollar the inter bank rate followed more closely the rising 
federal funds rate (Figure 11). The outcome is that appreciation expectations have further 
contributed to overinvestment in the Chinese economy by keeping interest rates low in an 
environment of worldwide increasing interest rates. 
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Figure 11: Money Market Rates in China, Hong Kong and US 
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5 Outlook 
 
We have shown that the overinvestment theories of Schumpeter (1983), Wicksell (2005) and 
Hayek (1976) allow explaining the boom and bust cycles in worldwide stock, real estate and 
raw material markets. Low cost liquidity can contribute to irrational investment booms that 
can make economic miracles self-fulfilling. Although, by definition it is difficult to spot 
bubbles before they burst the monetary overinvestment theories allow us to project a higher 
probability of boom and bust cycles in an environment of ample liquidity supply.  
 
The past experiences in East Asia as well as the recent crisis in the US real estate market have 
shown that expansionary monetary policies in response to financial instability can calm 
markets. In the view of the monetary overinvestment theories this effect would be only short 
term. In the long run a too low interest rate during the post-bubble downswing would 
postpone the “creative destruction” which is a necessary prerequisite for a sustained recovery. 
This is most evident from post-bubble Japan where structural inefficiencies were reinforced 
by the zero interest rate policy and where the periods of economic recovery were mainly led 
by exports and financial investment outside Japan.  
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The Japanese experience also shows that generous interest rate cuts after bursting bubbles 
contributed to new bubbles (outside Japan) which sooner or later lead to new financial 
turmoil. If today decisive interest cuts help to ban the danger of economic turmoil and 
recession, moral hazard in the banking sector and additional structural inefficiencies would 
emerge. The long-term adjustment burden would further rise. Yet in the future the scope to 
postpone the post-bubble adjustment burden by interest rate cuts is limited as world wide 
interest rates are already close to the zero bound.  
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